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Charbel SALIBA’s PhD defense: Error correction and reconciliation techniques for lattice-based key generation protocols

24/05/2022 | 10h00 - 13h00

In the last decade, there has been significant progress in the development of quantum computers, with massive investments by major tech companies. It is assumed that once large-scale quantum computers are built, many commonly used public key cryptosystems will no longer be secure. To prevent quantum attacks, researchers are already working on the design of post-quantum cryptographic protocols, and the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is holding an international competition to select new cryptographic standards. Lattice-based cryptographic constructions are promising candidates because they offer strong theoretical security guarantees and can be implemented efficiently. One of the most widely used cryptographic primitives based on lattices is the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem introduced by Regev. Later works have proposed structured variants of LWE such as Ring-LWE and Module-LWE, which allow for a more compact representation. In this thesis, we consider two lattice-based NIST candidates for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and propose new error correction and reconciliation techniques in order to improve their efficiency, their security, as well as their reliability. Unlike some previous works on error correction for lattice-based protocols, we provide rigorous error probability bounds. We first consider FrodoKEM, a lattice-based cryptosystem based on LWE, and introduce a modified error correction mechanism to improve its performance. Our encoder maps the secret key block-wise into a scaled version of the 8-dimensional Gosset lattice E_8. We propose three sets of parameters for our modified implementation. The first implementation outperforms FrodoKEM in terms of plausible security; the second allows to reduce the bandwidth by halving the modulus, and the third allows to increase key sizes. The second KEM we are considering is KyberKEM, which is based on Module-LWE. We propose a reconciliation technique using the lattice E_8, and show that our scheme can outperform KyberKEM in terms of security with comparable error probability and similar bandwidth requirements. We also investigate the use of higher dimensional lattices for reconciliation.   The defense will take place on site. Remote access is available through the following Zoom link:

https://cnrs.zoom.us/j/95407935540?pwd=dVMwUVlNOCtyMVdjQUpCYko3M1Zqdz09 Meeting ID: 954 0793 5540 Passcode: 2dyQBM



10h00 - 13h00




ENSEA Curium
6 avenue du ponceau
CERGY, 95014 France
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